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REARING AN UNEXpECTED CHILD: 
A COMpENSATORY MATTER?*
EDDIE KEANE
When speaking of damages in Tort law Salmond & Heuston state “[i]t 
is often discussed whether the governing principle is that of restitutio in 
integrum, or whether the defendant is only obliged to give the plaintiff fair 
compensation”. It would seem that in most situations where damages are 
assessed the courts consider fair compensation to be a monetary sum, based 
on actuarial evidence, which would amount to restitutio in integrum. Thus, 
in practice, the distinction between the principles is often blurred. However, 
some specific situations call for a deeper examination of the concept of fair 
compensation. A recent example is Byrne v Ryan2 where the Irish High 
Court was faced with determining what would constitute fair compensation 
for the negligent performance of a sterilisation operation. The case raised 
some interesting issues such as the role of public policy in determining the 
extent of recoverability and how such public policy is formed. The questions 
of how harm is defined and what exactly could be termed a recoverable loss 
were also raised.
In Byrne v Ryan, a mother gave birth to two children following a 
sterilisation operation. She sought damages inter alia for the cost of repeating 
the sterilisation procedure and the defendants did not contest this aspect of the 
matter. Interestingly, once negligence had been established, the defendants 
chose to concede damages for pain and suffering on the part of the mother 
during the two pregnancies. However, the central point in dispute was the 
mother’s claim for the financial cost of rearing the two children. Under the 
principle of restitutio in integrum one would expect the cost of rearing the 
children to be recoverable as being a foreseeable loss from the tortfeasor’s 
negligence. As Hale L.J. noted in Parkinson v St James and Seacroft 
University Hospital NHS Trust: “[g]iven that the doctor clearly does assume 
some responsibility for preventing conception, it is difficult to understand 
why he assumes responsibility for some but not all of the clearly foreseeable, 
indeed highly probable, losses resulting.”
The fact that the mother had a second child after the failed procedure 
might indicate an element of contributory negligence on the parents’ part. 
∗ The author would like to acknowledge the help and guidance of Eoin Quill, University 
of Limerick, in preparing this paper.
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However, Kelly J. found that during the first pregnancy the mother was under 
the impression that she had been pregnant at the time of the sterilisation. 
Therefore, after the birth of the first child the mother still believed the 
sterilisation procedure had been effective but too late to prevent that child 
from being conceived. It was only after the birth of the second child that the 
mother came to be aware of the possibility that the first child had also been 
conceived after the procedure had taken place. perhaps the most telling fact 
in relation to this aspect of the case was that the defendants did not plead 
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff and, consequently, Kelly 
J. did not have to consider the matter in detail.
With liability for negligence established, the question for the High Court 
was whether providing the mother with the financial cost of rearing the 
children amounted to fair compensation or not. In a relatively brief judgment 
Kelly J., having evaluated decisions from other jurisdictions, held that the 
cost of rearing the children was not recoverable. A review of the arguments 
for and against restitutio in integrum that were advanced in other jurisdictions 
helps to throw light on the judgment in Byrne v Ryan.5
THE ARGUMENTS FOR FAIR COMpENSATION
Many jurisdictions such as Canada6 and the majority of the states in the US7 
consider fair compensation not to include the cost of child rearing. However, 
for the present purposes the decision that best displays the arguments for 
limiting compensation is that of the House of Lords in McFarlane v Tayside 
Health Board.8 In this case a child was born to a couple after the father had 
undergone a vasectomy. The conception and subsequent birth of the child 
resulted from the negligence of the surgeon who carried out the vasectomy. 
Accordingly, the couple sought compensation for the pain and suffering of 
the mother during the pregnancy and the costs of rearing their unexpected 
daughter until she was eighteen years of age.
Lords Slynn of Hadley, Steyn, Hope of Craighead and Clyde formed 
the majority, holding that damages were only recoverable for the mother’s 
pain and suffering during the pregnancy. They agreed that an undesired 
5. It is worth noting that prior to deciding the extent of recoverable damages 
Kelly J. extensively reviewed the issue of the hospital being held vicariously 
liable for the negligence of the consultant and imposed liability on the hospital 
for any want of care on the part of the consultant. See above fn.2, p.48. 
6. Kealey v Berezowski (1996) 136 D.L.R. (4th) 708.
7. Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, 
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, pennsylvania, Tennessee, 
Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia and Wyoming. For a full discussion 
see LaCroix and Martin, ‘Damages in Wrongful Pregnancy Tort Actions’, in Ireland 
and Ward, Assessing Damages in Injuries and Deaths of Minor Children (Arizona: 
Lawyers and Judges Publishing, 2002) 93 at 97–98.
8. [2000] 2 A.C. 59.
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pregnancy and its attendant physical discomfort constituted harm. In the 
words of Lord Hope of Craighead “[t]he fact is that pregnancy and childbirth 
involve changes to the body which may cause, in varying degrees, discomfort, 
inconvenience, distress and pain.”9 Lord Millet dissented, contending that 
the discomforts of pregnancy could not constitute harm in the traditional 
sense as they were balanced by the joys of becoming a parent being what 
he described as “the price of parenthood.”0
It would seem from the speeches that in reaching their conclusions the 
Lords were heavily influenced by philosophical ideals of the virtue of human 
life and whether it would be morally acceptable to classify the birth of a 
child in the circumstances outlined as being a harm or loss.
Lord Millett gave perhaps the clearest example of this approach in relation 
to defining harm when he stated “[t]here is something distasteful, if not 
morally offensive, in treating the birth of a normal, healthy child as a matter 
for compensation”. In his opinion the birth of a healthy child, regardless of 
the desires of the parents, is always a blessing and so the core of the issue 
was whether this was counterbalanced by the financial loss incurred by the 
parents. He found “[i]t is morally offensive to regard a normal, healthy baby 
as more trouble and expense than it is worth.”2 Interestingly, although he 
found that neither the mother’s pain and suffering nor the cost of rearing 
the child was recoverable, he was he was unwilling to see the parents “sent 
away empty handed”. Thus he felt that a modest sum in the form of general 
damages was appropriate.
Lord Millett had willing allies in Lord Clyde and Lord Hope who, 
although viewing the matter from a different perspective, formed the opinion 
that awarding the costs of rearing the child would result in a disproportionate 
gain for the parents. Lord Clyde found that awarding damages only for the 
discomforts of pregnancy and childbirth represented “… the proper measure 
of restitution in the circumstances of the present case”.15 Lord Hope echoed 
this approach by holding that the financial losses of parenthood must be 
offset against its emotional benefits “[o]therwise the pursuers would be paid 
far too much”.6 He emphasised this conclusion by noting that the emotional 
benefits were incalculable and so, determining a net loss was impossible and 
consequently, the costs were not recoverable on grounds of indeterminacy.
Lord Steyn approached the matter from the perspective of what he termed 
as “distributive justice”, which, he felt, required an appropriate distribution 
9. [2000] 2 A.C. 59 at 87.
0. [2000] 2 A.C. 59 at 114.
. [2000] 2 A.C. 59 at 111.
2. [2000] 2 A.C. 59 at 114.
. [2000] 2 A.C. 59 at 114.
. Lord Clyde preferred to use the term “reasonable restitution” whereas Lord Hope 
focussed on the plaintiff “not giving anything back to the wrongdoer for the benefits” 
([2000] 2 A.C. 59 at 97).
15. [2000] 2 A.C. 59 at 106.
6. [2000] 2 A.C. 59 at 97.
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of burdens amongst society. In his opinion this concept of justice could be 
divined by considering the view of an average member of society. He said 
“[i]t may become relevant to ask of the commuters on the Underground the 
following question: Should the parents of an unwanted but healthy child be 
able to sue the doctor or hospital for compensation equivalent to the cost of 
bringing up the child?”7 Lord Steyn felt that an average person would abhor 
the idea and consider the parents of the healthy child the most appropriate to 
bear the cost of rearing the child. On these grounds the costs of child rearing 
were not recoverable.
Lords Slynn of Hadley and Hope of Craighead took the view that the 
matter involved the question of pure economic loss. Thus, their approach 
was to use the test laid down in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman,18 in 
particular the “fair, just and reasonable” limb of the test. Lord Slynn asked 
was it fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty on the doctor in relation to 
the economic interest of the patient? Ultimately he held that it was not, as 
the doctor would not have undertaken to protect the economic interests of the 
patient nor would the claimant have relied on the doctor to do so. Therefore 
he held “[i]f a client wants to be able to recover such costs he or she must 
do so by an appropriate contract”.19 Lord Hope was of the same opinion in 
holding “[t]he mere fact that it was reasonably foreseeable that the pursuers 
would have to pay for the costs of rearing their child does not mean that they 
have incurred a loss of the kind, which is recoverable.”20
While the decision as to the costs of child rearing was unanimous the 
conflicting reasons that were relied upon, ultimately serve to undermine each 
other; furthermore each of the varied grounds are themselves problematic 
for reasons that will be discussed anon.
THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF RESTITUTIo IN INTEgRUM
The leading arguments in favour of restitutio in integrum are found in the 
Australian High Court case of Cattanach v Melchior.2 This case dealt with 
the same problem that faced Kelly J. in the Irish High Court. In a joint 
application the mother and the father claimed the cost of rearing the child 
from the doctor that had negligently advised the mother after her sterilisation. 
Following an extensive review of the jurisprudence in Australia and other 
jurisdictions the court held by a four to three majority that damages should 
include the costs of rearing the unexpected child.
The majority, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Callinan J.J. approached 
the matter from the principle in overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock 
7. [2000] 2 A.C. 59 at 82.
18. [1990] 1 All E.R. 568.
19. [2000] 2 A.C. 59 at 76.
20. [2000] 2 A.C. 59 at 95.
2. [2003] 215 C.L.R. 1.
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& Engineering Co Ltd (The Wagon Mound),22 that a defendant will be liable 
for the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his negligence. Taking this 
approach meant that in the opinion of the majority restitutio in integrum 
should be the starting point from which to examine the matter. Thus, their 
essential questions were twofold. First, is the cost of rearing the child causally 
connected to the doctor’s negligence? Second, was it a reasonably foreseeable 
expense? Answering both the questions in the affirmative meant that the cost 
would be recoverable unless “strong reason” suggested otherwise. Clearly, 
if there were to be a strong reason, it would be determined by what McHugh 
and Gummow JJ. described as “the policy of the law”.2 It is interesting to 
note that this approach suggests a different way of contemplating the problem 
to that preferred by the House of Lords. Where the House of Lords was 
prepared to use policy as a means of limiting the imposition of a duty, the 
Australian High Court see the role of policy as relating to a determination 
on remoteness. It is submitted that the effect of this difference is not to be 
underestimated.
Each of the majority dealt with the issue of policy in slightly different 
ways. In McHugh and Gummow JJ.’s opinion this policy could be ascertained 
by asking two deceptively simple questions. First, is the protection of the 
family unit and its associated values an essential aspect of society? If so, then 
is there a “general recognition in the community that those values demand 
that there must be no award of damages”.2 In their judgment McHugh and 
Gummow JJ. held the policy of the law would be opposed to limiting the 
damages available. It is interesting to note that in their opinion the policy 
of the law could be determined by the judicial awareness of a “general 
recognition in the community.”
Kirby J. considered this method of divining policy to be most unreliable 
and merely constituted another example of judges applying personal opinions 
that were “formed in the far-off days of judicial youth, thirty or more years 
earlier, when social facts were significantly different”.25 He preferred not 
to expound a theory of how the correct policy should be divined. Instead 
he felt that the grounds used in the dissenting judgments and in other 
jurisdictions for the application of a policy limiting damages were flawed 
and held “[n]either the invocation of Scripture nor the invention of a fictitious 
oracle on the Underground (not even its Australian equivalent) authorises a 
court of law to depart from the ordinary principles governing the recovery 
of damages for the tort of negligence.”26 As such anything less than sound 
legal principle was not sufficient to warrant limiting the application of The 
Wagon Mound principle and in the absence of such the cost of child rearing 
must be recoverable.
Callinan J. approached the issue of policy from a different viewpoint. 
22. [1961] A.C. 388 at 423.
2. [2003] 215 C.L.R. 1 at 73.
2. [2003] 215 C.L.R. 1 at 77.
25. [2003] 215 C.L.R. 1 at 164.
26. [2003] 215 C.L.R. 1 at 151.
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Rather than second-guess the thoughts of the “oracle on the underground” 
he examined the pragmatic effects of limiting damages. One of these effects 
would be that the extent of a doctor’s liability would be curtailed solely 
on the grounds of policy. Callinan J. stated that this “would be tantamount 
to the conferral of a new form of immunity upon doctors and hospital 
authorities”.27 In noting the “increasing judicial aversion to the enjoyment 
of special privilege or advantage in litigation”,28 he felt that the policy of the 
law should forbid the creation of new immunities unless the public interest 
required such immunity. In the current case Callinan J. felt that the public 
interest of “corrective justice” was best served by the tortfeasor compensating 
the victim in full for all foreseeable damages.
The majority also addressed themselves to the suggestion that the financial 
cost of rearing the child could be offset against the benefits of having a child. 
Essentially they found that in order to offset a benefit against a loss, both the 
benefit and the loss would have to be of the “same interest”. In this situation 
the loss that the parents were claiming was financial and the benefit would 
be emotional. Kirby J. stated that “emotional and other benefits and burdens 
resulting from such a birth… are different in quality from the costs incurred 
in child-raising”.29 Callinan J. was of the view that “[t]he reciprocal joy and 
affection of parenthood can have no financial equivalence to the costs of 
rearing him. One is no substitute for the other”.0 Thus, the idea of offsetting 
the benefit of the child’s society against the financial burden of rearing the 
child was not sustainable.
In a reflection of the House of Lords position, the majority of the court was 
in agreement on the eventual decision reached but differed as to the reasoning 
behind their conclusions. However it is to be noted that the differences in 
approach are not as marked as those of the House of Lords.
THE IRISH DECISION
On reviewing the English case law and noting the similarity between the 
House of Lords’ position and other jurisdictions, Kelly J. observed that “the 
question which I have to ask is one of principle or, if one prefers, policy.” He 
felt that as a novel type of case the matter could not be definitively decided 
on the basis of existing legal principles. In divining the policy to be applied 
Kelly J. was heavily influenced by the persuasive arguments of the House 
of Lords in the McFarlane case. In particular, he alluded to the concept of 
distributive justice, as propounded by Lord Steyn, and the concept that a 
healthy child cannot be described as harm, as advanced by Lord Millett. In 
agreeing with the policy underlying the McFarlane decision, Kelly J. held 
27. [2003] 215 C.L.R. 1 at 295.
28. [2003] 215 C.L.R. 1 at 295.
29. [2003] 215 C.L.R. 1 at 175.
0. [2003] 215 C.L.R. 1 at 298.
. [2007] I.E.H.C. 207.
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that a policy of non-recoverability should apply in Ireland. Interestingly, he 
also held that the policy of not awarding damages for the costs of rearing 
the child would complement the Constitutional protection guaranteed to 
the family, in that an award of damages in this these circumstances would 
undermine the dignity that the Constitution affords to the family and human 
life. It is submitted that the awarding of damages would have little or no 
effect on the emotional relationship between parent and child on which the 
family unit is based. The suggestion that an award of damages may upset 
the child in later life and induce a destructive feeling of being unwanted 
can be matched by the consideration that if anything would make the child 
feel unwanted it would be learning that his or her parents had taken drastic 
but unsuccessful measures to prevent conception. Moreover, the fact that 
damages were awarded to the mother for pain and suffering associated with 
an unwanted pregnancy significantly dilutes the force of that argument. If 
an award of damages for the cost of rearing the child would have a negative 
emotional impact so too would an award for the pain and suffering: in short, 
it is submitted that legal policy must insist that either no award of damages 
be made or that damages be recovered under all heads. That said, Kelly J. 
has defined Irish policy to be that general damages may be awarded for the 
pain and suffering involved in the pregnancy as well as the medical expenses 
incurred both during the pregnancy and repeating the failed sterilisation 
procedure, but not for the cost of rearing the child.
CONCLUSIONS
It would seem that the arguments in favour of limiting compensation can be 
listed under four headings.
The first is that this is a case of pure economic loss or not. If it is, then 
the Caparo test for limiting the extent of the duty owed applies. However, 
the use of this test is problematic as Fordham notes: “[w]here legal principle 
is concerned, the boundaries between the various elements of negligence 
tend to be quite blurred.”2 If the ratio of Caparo is that in situations of pure 
economic loss a duty will be imposed only where special circumstances 
suggest it is fair, just or reasonable to do so, the corollary is that a duty 
would not be imposed in circumstances where to do so would be unfair or 
unjust. But what if the duty is already established and not contested? What, 
if any, is the role of the Caparo test? The orthodox view is that the role of the 
Caparo test is to limit the extent of the defendant’s liability. However, under 
traditional principles the extent of liability is a remoteness issue, not a duty 
issue. It is submitted, that using the Caparo test in relation to remoteness 
blurs the important, but often overlooked, distinction between imposing a 
duty and imposing liability. The fact that this confusion has occurred in other 
2. Margaret Fordham, “A Life Less Ordinary- The Rejection of Actions for Wrongful 
Life”, (2007) 15 Torts Law Journal, 123 at 129.
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situations does not justify its use in this type of case.
Nevertheless, if the distinction between duty and liability is disregarded, 
the question then becomes what is fair, just and reasonable? In general, much 
emphasis is placed on what the court feels is the opinion of the ordinary 
person in the street. It is submitted that this method of divining policy is 
fraught with danger and while it contributes to the fluidity of policy, it is 
ultimately influenced by the subjective views of the judiciary involved. 
Symmons emphasises the unpredictability of “such judicial ‘Gallup polling’ 
of the sentiments of society [that] is bound to be both speculative and 
subjective in many instances.”
It is submitted that this is not a case of pure economic loss. While the 
head of damages for the mother is rather straightforward in that her personal 
losses are consequential to the personal injury she suffered as a result of 
the pregnancy, can we point to a recognisable harm that the parents jointly 
suffered? A possible category may be the concept of a breach of their autonomy 
in deciding the size of their family or, put another way, an interference with 
their right to marital privacy. Whether this is a constitutional issue35 or an 
issue capable of being covered by the law of negligence6 is irrelevant for the 
present purposes. The important point is that this interference is regarded as 
a specific harm capable of being compensated by an award of damages. The 
natural and probable consequence of interfering with this right is the birth 
of more children and the attendant financial cost of rearing these additional 
children, which would suggest that the financial loss in rearing the additional 
children is consequential to the interference with the parents’ autonomy and 
not pure economic loss, as we currently understand it.
The second consideration for limiting damages is found in Lord Steyn’s 
invocation of the concept of distributive justice. It is to be noted that the 
use of the phrase “distributive justice” is somewhat misleading in this case. 
Distributive justice tends to convey a notion of spreading the burden over 
a large section of the community, usually through the vehicle of insurance 
cover, whereas here the concept is used to allocate the burden between 
two sets of individuals. It is better to view this approach as involving a 
fair allocation of the burden as distinct from a distribution of the burden. 
It is submitted that to impose such a burden on the parents is not only the 
antithesis of distributive justice because it moves the burden away from the 
doctor who may be able to spread the cost through the vehicle of insurance 
cover, but is also to the detriment of corrective justice as it undermines one of 
the primary functions of Tort law, which is to hold wrongdoers accountable 
. See White v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police [1999] 1 All E.R. 1 for 
use of this approach in relation to recoverability for negligently caused psychological 
harm.
. C R Symmons, “policy Factors in Actions for Wrongful Birth” (1987) 50 Mod L 
Rev 269 at 280.
35. See Mcgee v The Attorney general [1974] I.R. 284.
6. See judgment of Quirke J. in gray v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform 
[2007] I.E.H.C. 52.
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for their actions. In general, one would expect responsibility to lie with the 
wrongdoer and not the victim.
The third argument is that the birth of a healthy child is not a harm that 
merits an award of damages. Nolan7 suggests that whether the birth of a 
child is considered harm must depend on the circumstances in which the 
child is born. This determination must be made from the viewpoint of the 
woman involved. If a pregnancy is not desired to the point that active steps 
are taken to prevent it, then any ensuing pregnancy must be defined as harm. 
Lord McCluskey in the Second Division of the Court of Session stated “[i]t is 
sufficient to say that a woman who becomes pregnant despite her deliberate 
choice not to become pregnant suffers damnum and loss in the form of 
significant consequences for her physical condition, being consequences 
which she did not desire.”38 Thus, the key to the concept of harm in this type 
of case is that what some may see as a blessing to others is a loss. As such 
there can be no blanket rule defining whether pregnancy is harm or not.
Fourth, it is contended that the benefits of parenthood must be off-set 
against the financial loss and as these benefits are incalculable it is equally 
impossible to measure the net loss. In relation to the offsetting of benefits, 
it can be argued that the benefits of having a healthy child can be offset 
against the interference with the parents’ autonomy and as such may cancel 
out an award of general damages for the interference. This offsetting may 
be allowable on the basis that the loss of autonomy is an emotional loss 
that can be considered in the same vein as the emotional benefit of having 
a healthy child. However, to consider offsetting the emotional benefits of 
having a child against the financial losses incurred in rearing the child is to 
compare apples with oranges. As noted above, an emotional benefit should 
not be used to cancel out a loss of a different interest.
Turning to the arguments for restitutio in integrum perhaps the most 
persuasive is the approach taken by Callinan J. in the Cattanach case, namely 
that to limit recoverability is in effect to create immunity for doctors for 
certain aspects of their work. This creation of a new example of immunity 
would seem to be directly at odds with the current trends in tort law.39 It 
would seem that the other arguments in favour of restitutio in integrum are 
heavily based on criticisms of the rationale used by the courts that have 
limited damages.
While it may seem repulsive to think that a family who love their child 
can force a doctor to pay for the financial cost of rearing that child, from 
a legal point of view this option is far more acceptable than not providing 
any damages where a wrong has been committed. The current approach 
involves an unprincipled compromise and, as Lord Millett noted, “[t]he 
only difference between the two heads of damage claimed is temporal”.0 In 
7. Donal Nolan, “New Forms of Damage in Negligence” (2007) 70 M.L.R. 59.
38. McFarlane v Tayside Health Board (1998) S.L.T. 307 at 315–316. 
39. See in particular Hall & Co. v Simons [2000] 3 All E.R 250.
0. [2000] 2 A.C. 59 p.114. The author would like to point out that Lord Millett used this 
logic to find that no damages were recoverable, whereas the author would suggest 
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this light it is submitted that the true definition of fair compensation for the 
losses incurred as a result of a negligently performed sterilisation procedure 
can only be restitutio in integrum.
that this logic also applies to the converse proposition. 
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